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NOTES
SECURITY DEPOSITS IN RESIDENTIAL
LEASES
INTRODUCTION
"The complexities of city life, and the many problems of mod-
ern society in general, have blossomed into new problems for lessors
and lessees."' Due to the limited financial resources of some and to
the desire of others to escape the burdens and responsibilities of
home ownership, the supply of potential lessees and the demand for
rental housing are enormous.'
In anticipation of and in response to the great demand for
rental housing, a steadily growing concentration of real estate own-
ership has emerged. A growing portion of rental housing is owned
and managed by the professional lessor.' Since the lessor is generally
heavily mortgaged, he must generate a profit from his high overhead
budget.' All rents must be collected and sundry losses resulting from
damage to the leasehold kept to a minimum if the lessor is to realize
a satisfactory return on his investment.'
To insure the collection of rents and to avoid losses, the lessor
has resorted to the standard inclusion of a security deposit clause
in the lease contract. Mere ownership of realty does not warrant the
use of the security deposit by the lessor. However, when the lessor
has severely extended his own financial position in preparing the
realty for the potential lessee's benefit and use, such investment
sufficiently warrants added protection of the lessor's interests. The
basic purpose of the security deposit clause is to free the lessor from
the risk of losses through nonpayment of rents or by damages to the
leasehold. Doubtless this is a proper purpose; but when it has been
accomplished, or when the deposit becomes susceptible to unwar-
ranted or improper uses by the lessor, protections for the lessee are
required.
1. 2 R. POWELL,, REAL PROPERTY 221(l), at 179 (1967).
2. See generally A. WEIMAR, H. Horr, G. BLOOM, REAL ESTATE (6th ed. 1965); THE
PRE'IDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING., A DECENT HOME, (1968) [hereinafter cited as
KAISER COMMISSION REPORTI.
3. A. WEIMER, H. HOYT, G. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 416-17.
4. S. MAISEIL, FINANCING. REAL ESTATE 357 (1956).
5. G. STERNI.IEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 121-22 (1966).
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THE LESSOR'S DILEMMA
Upon premature termination of the lease by the lessee, the
lessor has several legal remedies that he may pursue. Since the
lessor must, out of financial necessity, generate revenue and profit
from the leasehold, he must seek a guarantee that the unpaid rents
and damages will be recovered. The lessor may legally bind the
lessee to all payments due under the lease contract, but if the lessee
disappears or simply becomes unable to pay, the lessor must bear
the loss. A legal right to hold the lessee responsible is of little prag-
matic value when there is no viable party to proceed against.' Nor
can the lessor act in anticipation of a loss or damage since he has
no idea who will be responsible for the loss suffered until the of-
fender has made himself unavailable.
If the lessor is to realize continued benefit from additional rent-
als, the relative attractiveness of the premises must be maintained.
Even upon successful payment of all rents and timely termination
of the lease, the lessee remains legally responsible for waste he has
caused and for failure to make ordinary and reasonable repairs to
preserve the condition of the premises.7 But in the case of the disap-
pearing or delinquent lessee, such obligations are as hollow as the
lessor's remedy for nonpayment of rent.
In dealing with these risks, lessors may rely on the lessee's
personal integrity and financial resources. Often, however, the pro-
posed lessee is a total unknown to the lessor. Little, if anything, is
known of his financial status and personal background, and this
anonymity is even greater in metropolitan areas where many lessees
are basically transient For the lessor to investigate the integrity
and solvency of each potential lessee, a certain amount of time and
energy must be expended, and in some cases obtaining the pertinent
information is impossible. The lessor confronts this uncertainty by
seeking a more pragmatic hedge through the use of a readily accessi-
ble fund.
Most states provide creditor remedies for the lessor even though
there is no mention of these remedies in the lease contract.' The
lessor is given a security interest in the lessee's personality in the
6. KAISER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 39.
7. Townshend v. Moore, 33 N.J.L. 284 (1869); Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450 (1873).
8. KAISER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 39.
9. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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form of common law right of distraint or statutory lien.' 0 The lessor
may unilaterally proceed under these creditor remedies when he
feels losses are imminent. But these lessor remedies have proven to
be a greater burden than benefit in many instances. The unscrupu-
lous lessee is often gone and the economically depressed lessee has
no collateral of significant value to levy upon. Then too, when per-
sonalty is seized, the lessor's interest in the goods may be subordi-
nate to a security interest of the original seller." Even when success-
ful in seizing sufficient personalty, the obvious lack of liquidity
necessitates additional efforts before a loss is satisfied completely.
Since the common law and statutory property remedies have
not satisfied the lessor's need for a readily accessible security fund,
the lessor has resorted to contractual protection through insertion
of specific clauses and convenants in the lease contract. These
clauses, in various forms and terms, have called for prepayment of
a fund at the inception of the tenancy. These prepayments fall into
four categories: 2
1) advance payment of rent
2) bonus or additional consideration for the execution
of the lease
3) liquidated damages
4) a security deposit to secure faithful performance of
the lease by the lessee.
Advance payments of rent and bonus considerations pass full
title to the lessor immediately. The lessor is entitled to keep the full
deposit even though the lessee has faithfully complied with the
terms of the lease. Under prepayment of rent the lessor merely keeps
the deposit as the last installment of rent. A bonus consideration is
a quasi-insurance premium the lessee is forced to pay. Liquidated
contract clauses result in a total forfeiture of the prepayment upon
breach of the lease by the lessee, regardless of actual damages.
Because of the overtones of penalty and forfeiture, courts have been
predisposed to hold liquidated damages as invalid. 3
10. Id.
11. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301 (1972).
12. Werming v. Shapiro, 118 Cal. App. 2d 72, 75, 257 P.2d 74, 76 (1953).
13. Werming v. Shapiro, 118 Cal. App. 2d 72, 257 P.2d 74 (1953); Gitlin v. Schneider,
42 Misc. 2d 230, 247 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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Because of judicial distaste for forfeitures without fault the
device which residential lessors have come to rely upon is the secu-
rity deposit. Under traditional contract principles, cases of doubt or
confusion are to be resolved in favor of the party who did not partici-
pate in the construction of the lease. Without exception the residen-
tial lease is drawn up by the lessor, and consequently the prepay-
ment provisions have usually been construed as security deposits. 4
The security deposit provides the lessor with a fund he may resort
to in the event of any losses caused by a particular breach of cove-
nant.'15 Under the security deposit interpretation, the party at fault
suffers the loss.
CONTRACTUAL ALTERNATIVES
Freedom to contract guides and limits the obligations and liber-
ties of the two parties. The lessee may agree to secure only a particu-
lar obligation; he may agree to secure payment of all rents, or he
may agree only to cover repairs for damages to the premises. Contra-
riwise, the security deposit clause may guarantee in broad and all-
inclusive terms the performance of all covenants present in the
lease." Whatever the extent of the obligations secured, the deposit
may be applied for those purposes only. 7 The security deposit
clause itself does not alter the legal rights and remedies of the two
parties; rather it establishes which rights and remedies are to be
secured by the deposit.
Upon the payment of the security deposit, the lessor is entitled
to retain possession of the deposit until performance or discharge of
all covenants assumed by the lessee and covered by the security
deposit clause. 6 Where the security deposit clause calls for the ful-
fillment of the lease generally, the lessor may retain possession of
the deposit until the termination of the lease, at which time he must
return the deposit or account .for the retention, whether partial or
14. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Auker v. Gerold, 67 Ill. App.
2d 425, 214 N.E.2d 618 (1966).
15. State by Lefkowitz v. Parker, 67 Misc. 2d 36, 323 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T.),
rev'd on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 2d 542, 327 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1971).
16. Washington Industrial Building Corp. v. National Bank of Commerce, 39 F.2d 842
(9th Cir. 1930); In re Hool Realty Company, 2 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1924); Chicago Investment
Co. v. Hardtner, 167 Miss. 375, 148 So. 214 (1933).
17. People ex rel Belleci v. Klinger, 164 Misc. 530, 300 N.Y.S. 408 (Magis. Ct. 1938).
18. Kane v. Dune, 2 Ill. App. 2d 50, 118 N.E.2d 66 (1954); Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala.
80, 152 So. 222 (1934).
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 3
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complete.' When the deposit is to cover possible legal waste to the
premises, the lessee has a continuing liability, not for rent, but for
damages, and the lessor may retain the deposit for a reasonable time
after the termination of the lease for purposes of determining the
extent of damages .2
Nonperformance or breach of a lease covenant by the lessee
does not vest full title to the deposit in the lessor.2 ' The lessor is
merely allowed the right to resort to the security deposit in the event
that actual damages are sustained, and then, such application may
only be made to the extent of actual indemnification for losses cov-
ered by the deposit. 2 Where the entire deposit is needed to satisfy
losses suffered by the lessor, the lessee's ownership in the deposit is
terminated. 23 The lessor may hold the lessee liable for damages sus-
tained in excess of the security deposit and proceed against the
lessee under a tort claim. 24
During the life of the tenancy the lessor usually maintains pos-
session of the deposit. In the absence of statutory modification or
specific contractual agreement, the lessor is not restricted in his use
of the funds and assumes no duty to pay interest. 25 He may use the
funds for any purpose, including those of his own.26 This liberty of
use is found particularly when the lease provides for a stipulated
payment of interest to the lessee, but has been found when no such
provision is made.2 7
If the lessee is concerned about the management and use of the
deposit during the tenancy, he may seek to limit the use of the funds
by the lessor. He may require the lessor to segregate the funds and
19. Wald v. Gold, 1 Misc. 2d 756, 147 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Supt. Ct. 1955); Kane v. Dune, 2
I1. App. 2d 50, 118 N.E.2d 66 (1954); Green v. Frahm, 176 Cal. 259, 168 P. 114 (1917).
20. United Cigar Stores of America v. Friend, 257 Ill. App. 359 (1930).
21. Prudential Westchester Corp. v. Tomasino, 5 App. Div. 2d 489, 172 N.Y.S.2d 652,
aff'd 6 N.Y.2d 824, 188 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1958).
22. Peirson v. Llyods First Mortgage Co., 260 N.Y. 214, 183 N.E. 368 (1932).
23. State by Lefkowitz v. Parker, 67 Misc. 2d 36, 323 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T.),
rev'd on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 2d 542, 327 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1971).
24. Zalonski v. McMahon, 3 Cir. 533, 220 A.2d 35 (Conn. 1966); Kapan v. Katz, 58 So.
2d 853 (Fla. 1952).
25. Matter of Cromwell, 102 Misc. 503, 169 N.Y.S. 204 (Sur. Ct. 1918).
26. Raurbach Heights Theatres, 239 App. Div. 203, 267 N.Y.S. 208 (1933); Jahmes v.
Propper, 238 App. Div. 326, 264 N.Y.S. 219 (1933).
27. Levinson v. Shapiro, 238 App. Div. 158, 263 N.Y.S. 585 (1933), aff'd 263 N.Y. 591,
189 N.E. 713 (1933); Colantuoni v. Balene, 95 N.J.Eq. 748, 123 A. 541 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923).
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keep them intact throughout the term of the lease. 8 However, such
restrictive limitations are not often found in the lease, for a lessee
will require the deposit to be put in the hands of a third party
depositary if he is sufficiently concerned with the use and manage-
ment of the deposit. Thus, when the deposit is left in the possession
of the lessor, few, if any, restrictions are placed upon its use and
management.
JUDICIAL APPROACH TO THE TRANSACTION
Because of the generality and vagueness in terms, the pertinent
relationship of the parties with regard to the deposit is ill-defined.
Many times the security deposit is simply an oral understanding.
Whenever there is a transfer of property-in this instance
money-from the owner to another party, any number of possible
relationships may result.29 In a given instance the nature of the
relationship is dependent upon the intention of the parties involved
in the transfer. In each of the possible legal relationships the physi-
cal act is identical.
The more definite and exacting the security deposit clause the
less creation of contractual intent need be done by the courts. In the
case of residential leases the "written" intent of the parties is often
unclear and vague. The intent of the parties becomes even more
oblique when, as is the practice with many lessors, the security
deposit comes about as a result of an oral "understanding." The
courts are hard pressed to find an intent and thus affix legal mean-
ing to the transaction. In struggling to define the security deposit
transaction in cases where the lessor is to maintain possession of the
deposit throughout the life of the lease, the courts have relied on
three diverse theories: debt, pledge and trust. 0
Debt
The relationship of debtor/creditor is created if it is found that
28. Atlas v. Moritz, 217 App. Div. 38, 216 N.Y.S. 490 (1926).
29. A. Scorr, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 4A, at 27-28 (6th ed. 1960).
30. New York courts typify the confusion. New York courts have utilized all three
theories. Goodman v. Schached, 144 Misc. 905, 260 N.Y.S. 883 (Nassau County Ct. 1932);
Haskel v. 60 West Fifty-Third Street Corp., 138 Misc. 595, 246 N.Y.S. 698 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1929), alf'd 231 App. Div. 800, 246 N.Y.S. 875 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Atlas v. Moritz, 217 App. Div.
38, 216 N.Y.S. 490 (1926).
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 3
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the title to the deposit should pass immediately to the lessor.2 Such
a relationship is generally found when interest has been promised
to the lessee by the lessor,32 but an agreement that interest will be
paid is not necessarily determinative. The decisive inquiry is
whether the lessor is able to use the deposit as his own. Under the
debt theory the lessor is under no obligation to segregate the deposit
into a separate fund, but is free to use the deposit as he pleases.33
The lessor has no liability for misappropriation of funds during the
lease term, but has the absolute duty to produce an equal amount
upon the successful completion of the lease. 4 The lessee must rely
solely upon the lessor's personal integrity and financial strength for
the ultimate return of the deposit.3 5
The debtor/creditor approach to the security deposit reflects
the lessor's tendency to view the deposit as an absolute transfer and
the lessor's practice to use the deposit with unchecked discretion.
Courts have reasoned that the parties are free to contract as they
please and that the lessee has the right to restrict the lessor's use of
the deposit if he so wishes. Therefore, the absence of any restrictions
and limitations upon the lessor's use of the fund is viewed as an
implied consent on the part of the lessee." However, when the words
"security deposit" are used, such terminology, absent any specific
grants or concessions, smacks of a conditional intent. At most such
terminology indicates a limited purpose and not a blanket authori-
zation of use." To interpret as intent the absence of any restrictive
language concerning the use of the deposit would be creation of an
intent through negative implication. It is a strained interpretation
to say the lessee through his silence sanctioned full use of the de-
posit by the lessor.
31. Jahmes v. Propper, 238 App. Div. 326, 264 N.Y.S. 219 (1933); Levinson v. Shapiro,
238 App. Div. 158, 263 N.Y.S. 585 (1933), afJ'd 263 N.Y. 591, 189 N.E. 713 (1933); Mendelson-
Siverman, Inc. v. Malco Trading Corp., 146 Misc. 215, 260 N.Y.S. 881 (App. T. 1932), af'd
mer. 238 App. Div. 852, 262 N.Y.S. 991 (1933), af['d mem. 262 N.Y. 621 (1933); Goodman
v. Schached, 144 Misc. 905, 260 N.Y.S. 883 (Nassau County Ct. 1932).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 12g (1959).
33. Cases cited note 31 supra.
34. Levinson v. Shapiro, 238 App. Div. 158, 263 N.Y.S. 585 (1933), aff'd 263 N.Y. 591,
189 N.E. 713 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Goodman v. Schached, 144 Misc. 905, 260 N.Y.S. 883 (Nassau
County Ct. 1932).
35. Cases cited note 34 supra.
36. Id.
37. Wilson, Lease Security Deposits, 34 Coi. L. REV. 426, 459-60 (1934).
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Pledge
Several courts have applied the pledge theory to the security
deposit transaction .3 Traditional pledge theory requires a pledgor
to transfer personalty (deposit) to a pledgee who is to maintain
possession of the personalty as security for some debt or obligation.
The title to the fund must remain in the pledgor3 9 The lessor (pled-
gee) may become liable in conversion for misappropriation of the
deposit during the term of the lease. 0 Pledge theory courts have not
been so restrictive as to prohibit the use of the deposit by the pled-
gee/lessor during the life of the lease. The only real limitation upon
the lessor is that he may not permanently dispose of the funds for
his own purposes so as to deprive the lessee of its ultimate return.'
As with the debt theory, the pledge concept is difficult to apply
to the security deposit transaction. Such a construction of the trans-
action is merely a creation of intent by the courts. The courts are
forced to apply a negative implication and say that the pledgee may
use the deposit for his own purposes in the absence of express limita-
tion by the lessee. Again, it is just as reasonable to assume the lessee
really was concerned with the management of the fund as to assume
the lessee was not concerned. 3
Trust
The trust theory has been applied mainly by New York courts.
Atlas v. Moritz 13 first employed this mongrel trust theory. The lessor
who maintains possession of the deposit is the trustee, but the title
to the deposit remains in the lessee. Subsequent applications have
narrowly applied the trust theory for the purpose of defining the
38. Rasmussen v. Helen Realty Co., 92 Ind. App. 278, 168 N.E. 717 (1929); Reed v.
Bristol County Realty Co., 250 Mass. 284, 145 N.E. 455 (1924); Colantuoni v. Balene, 95
N.J.Eq. 748, 123 A. 541 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923); Kaufman v. Williams, 92 N.J.L. 182, 104 A.
202 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918). A similar approach has been offered under bailment theory. Green
v. Fraham, 176 Cal. 259, 168 P. 114 (1917).
39. Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Long, 309 Pa. 470, 164 A. 346 (1932); City Invest-
ment Co. v. Pringle, 73 Cal. App. 782, 239 P. 302 (1925); Keeble v. Jones, 187 Ala. 207, 65
So. 384 (1914).
40. Atlas v. Moritz, 217 App. Div. 38, 216 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Colantuoni v.
Balene, 95 N.J.Eq. 748, 123 A. 541 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923). Courts following Atlas v. Moritz
have spoken of the lessor's misuse as a breach of trust rather than conversion. Frost v.
Paulster Realty Co., 138 Misc. 794, 798, 247 N.Y.S. 808, 812 (Westchester County Ct. 1930).
41. Colantuoni v. Balene, 95 N.J.Eq. 748, 123 A. 541 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923).
42. Harris, A Reveille to Lessees, 15 S. CAl.. L. REV. 421 (1942).
43. Atlas v. Moritz, 217 App. Div. 38, 216 N.Y.S. 490 (1926).
(Vol. 8
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lessor's (trustee's) duties." The thrust of the trust theory in Atlas
is the fiduciary position the lessor assumes when he takes possession
of the deposit.
The lessor may become liable in conversion for misuse of the
deposit, but his misuse of the deposit during the lease term does not
give the lessee the power to treat his obligations under the lease as
ended since the property obligations of the tenancy continue sepa-
rate and distinct from this contractual obligation. Courts have been
lenient in imposing fiduciary duties upon the lessor. Commingling
of deposits, investment for the lessor's benefit and lack of adequate
records all have been tolerated by the courts." The lessor's conver-
sion of the deposit, if it continues until the termination of the lease,
prohibits the application of the deposit against damages sustained. 7
But the lessor is allowed to retain possession of the deposit and
apply it against damages if he subsequently segregates the deposit. 8
Such concession to the lessor leaves the lessee with no real defense
against the misuse of the deposit by the lessor.
Perhaps the real flaw in applying trust theory to the security
deposit transaction is the conflict of interests it creates in the trus-
tee.
True, the landlord holds the money for the tenant and may
have to return it intact, but his holding is coupled with an
interest, an interest that may ripen into a right upon the
happening of certain contingencies specified in the lease. In
the ordinary relation of trustee and cestui que trust the
former has no interest, contingent or otherwise.49
A true trustee's duty is to manage the fund solely for the benefit of
44. Madison Realty Co. v. Weiss, 133 Misc. 318, 232 N.Y.S. 43 (App. T. 1928); Ulmour
Garage Inc. v. Stivers Inc., 128 Misc. 400, 218 N.Y.S. 683 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1926).
45. In re Tru-Seal Aluminum Products Corp., 170 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd
278 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1960); Tow v. Maidman, 56 Misc. 2d 468, 288 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1968);
Euclid Holding Co. v. Kermacoe Realty Co., 131 Misc. 466, 227 N.Y.S. 103 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1928).
46. Abrahamson v. Brett, 143 Ore. 14, 21 P.2d 229 (1933); Watzler v. Patterson, 73 Cal.
App. 527, 238 P. 1077 (1925); Dutton v. Christie, 63 Wash. 372, 115 P. 856 (1911).
47, In re DeGregorio, 219 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); In re Perfection Technical
Services Press Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 352, 256 N.Y.S.2d 166, aff'd 18 N.Y.2d 644,273 N.Y.S.2d
71, 219 N.E.2d 424 (1965).
48. Cases cited note 45 supra.
49. People v. Horowitz, 138 Misc. 794, 798, 247 N.Y.S. 365, 370 (Magis. Ct. 1931).
1973]
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the beneficiary.' This limited application of the trust to the security
deposit is more akin to pledge theory, since both the Atlas trustee
and the true pledgee hold the deposit in a fiduciary capacity.'
INEQUITIES AND WEAKNESSES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION
Although freedom to contract exists in the security deposit
transaction, determining the amount, conditions and restrictions
generally resolves itself into a one-sided bargaining process. The
relative bargaining strength of the lessor, which determines to a
great degree the amount of the deposit and the conditions imposed
in the lease, is complete in the residential lease. 51
On the other hand, tenants have little leverage to enforce
demands [in leases]. Various impediments to competition
in the rental housing market, [such as severe shortages of
adequate housing], racial and class discriminations, and
standardized form leases have left the residential tenant in
a take it or leave it situation.53
As a result of this strategic advantage, the lessor has been able to
reap benefits beyond the original scope of the security deposit.
The use of third parties is not favored by lessors for two basic
reasons. During the term of the lease, possession of the deposit by
the lessor provides valuable investment opportunities. 4 If a cash
deposit were deposited with a trust company or other financial de-
positary, the lessee would be entitled to any and all income that is
earned on the deposit.5 In addition to the investment opportunity,
the deposit may be applied as working capital." The lessor, who
receives a considerable number of individually small deposits under
several leases, nets a substantial fund for investment or working
capital. All the lessor need do is maintain a small percentage of the
total deposits on hand to handle the normal tenancy turnover.
Such a windfall of cost-free capital is unique in the American
50. A. SCoTT, supra note 29, at 319.
51. Wilson, supra note 37, at 462.
52. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
53. 2 R. POWE[,L, supra note 1, at 183.
54. Wilson, supra note 37, at 433.
55. Stuarco, Inc. v. Slafbro Realty Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 80, 289 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1968);
Bobb v. Frank L. Talbot Theatre Co., 221 S.W. 372 (Mo. App. 1920).
56. Hanson, Current Interest Areas of Landlord Tenant Law in Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. REv.
376 (1973).
[Vol. 8
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business world. The cost of capital is that charge exacted upon the
use of money for the benefit derived therefrom. "It is not natural
for anyone to agree to pay interest on money unless he is entitled to
use the money as his own."5 Conversely, in business affairs a person
normally will not allow another to use his capital without some
charge or consideration. Only the lessor's dominant bargaining posi-
tion has freed him from the price normally exacted upon the use of
another's money. Lessors appear to be in a unique position in Amer-
ican business in having such a source of free capital.18
At the termination of the lease an even greater advantage in-
ures to the benefit of the lessor. The inconvenience and nonliquidity
that the lessor's right of distraint represented is effectively avoided
by the use of a security deposit.
Lessors who are engaged in making a great number of leases
do not favor the use of the third party depositary, especially
where the term is short and the deposit amounts to only a
few hundred dollars. A principal reason for demanding the
deposit form of security is the readiness with which such
security can be applied in satisfaction of defaults. If the
lessor holds the deposit himself this advantage exists to the
fullest degree. Upon occurrence of a default he can make his
own determination of the amount he is entitled to withdraw
from the deposit, provided the fund is sufficient, no delays
or difficulties are usually encountered in obtaining the sum
required. On the other hand, the convenience of application
is likely to be considerably decreased by placing the deposit
in the hands of a third party. In such a case, in order to
reach the deposit it is ordinarily incumbent upon the lessor
to satisfy the depositary of the existence of a breach by the
lessee and the extent of the loss sustained. If the lessor's
rights seem doubtful or are contested by the tenant, the
depositary, for his own protection, will probably refuse to
turn the deposit over to the lessor until there has been
adjudication on the matter. .... 5-
With the security deposit in the lessor's hands the potential for
57. A. ScoTT, supra note 29, at 45.
58. Utility companies, for example, require comparable deposits for their services, yet
are required to pay interest on such deposits. See, e.g., BURN'S IND. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
AND REGULATIONS (54-201)-C42 (Supp. 1973).
59. Wilson, supra note 37, at 437.
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unchecked discrimination and arbitrariness is greatest. Even
though he has only a contingent interest in the deposit, this interest
may become vested simply at the lessor's discretion. There is no
practical accountability for his action, for seldom does a lessee chal-
lenge the lessor's retention.
In the event the lessee seeks to challenge a retention of the
deposit by the lessor, he must sustain the burden of proof for all
allegations made."' He must show the lessor's duty to preserve the
deposit and his own satisfactory compliance with the lease.' How-
ever, when the lessor's retention is based on alleged damages to the
leasehold, a strong implication against the lessee exists since he is
the party in control and possession of the premises. By the time the
issue reaches court, the lessee is no longer in possession of the prem-
ises and the premises have often been repaired and/or relet to a
subsequent lessee. Thus the lessee has no concrete evidence to rebut
the lessor's claim for damages as evidenced by sales receipts for
materials, expenditures or contracts to repair.
Lack of initiative and perseverance often prevent pursuit of
time consuming and costly litigation for a relatively small deposit.
Ignorance of the law, limited financial resources and a desire to
"close-out" affairs quickly all tend to discourage such an endeavor
by the lessee. Consequently, the lessee is forced to abdicate to the
lessor's decision which often is unfair either as a result of conscious
effort or as a result of subconscious bias.
The lessor must be guided by and limited to the norm of com-
pensation.6 2 The security deposit may be relied upon only for those
losses which are covered by the security deposit clause.6 3 But the
lessor's determination of excessive wear and tear to the premises
may include a "penalty" under the guise of damages. Friction may
develop between the lessor and lessee during the lease and may have
even caused a premature surrender of the lease. Such friction may
unfairly influence the lessor in his evaluation of the leasehold's
60. Kaufman v. Williams, 92 N.J.L. 182, 104 A. 202 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918); Goldberg
v. Freeman, 92 N.Y.S. 237 (Sup. Ct. 1905).
61. Kaufman v. Williams, 92 N.J.L. 182, 104 A. 202 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918); Reznick v.
South Side Construction Co., 166 N.Y.S. 748 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
62. Prudential Westchester Corp. v. Tomasino, 5 App. Div. 2d 489, 172 N.Y.S.2d 652,
aff'd 6 N.Y.2d 824, 188 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1958); Sedlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461
(1920).
63. People ex rel Bellici v. Klinger, 164 Misc. 530, 300 N.Y.S. 408 (Magis. Ct. 1938).
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physical condition. An even more subtle overcharge occurs when, in
fact, actual repairs are warranted. When the lessor applies the de-
posit to these repairs, his concern is not for the best bargain in
materials and services. 4 There is no need to be economical so long
as the deposit covers the cost.
The security deposit should represent collateral for potential
damage or loss caused by the lessee, and not summary process for
the lessor. The lessor's claim as a creditor is no more deserving than
that of other creditors who enjoy considerably less advantage. 5 The
summary power which the lessor presently enjoys is contrary to all
modern notions of due process." In this adversary decision, the les-
sor is both judge and jury. The validity, or probable validity, of the
lessor's claim should be conclusively established before he can de-
prive the lessee of his property permanently.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Other lessor self-help remedies have come under heavy consti-
tutional attack as a result of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.17
and its progeny. Because the security deposit is a substitute for the
common law and statutory lessor distraint remedies, suspicion is
cast upon the constitutional soundness of the security deposit itself.
A pre-forfeiture hearing on the relative merits appears to be funda-
mental to due process and basic fairness.
Any due process argument necessitates a finding of state ac-
tion. 9 The courts have differed widely on the issue of state action. 0
Courts have found that a lessor acting unilaterally against lessee's
property is sufficient grounds for state action, reasoning that state
action has been interpreted to cover private individuals acting in
64. KAISER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 108-09.
65. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 394 U.S.
337 (1969).
66. Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
67. 394 U.S. 337 (1969).
68. Mihans v. Municipal Court of Berkeley-Albany Judicial District, 7 Cal. App. 3d
479, 488, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1970).
69. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
70. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corporation,
338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. I1. 1972); Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Sellers v.
Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa.
1970). Contra, McGuane v. Chernango Ct., Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970); Kerrigan v.
Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn. 1971); Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md.
1971).
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support or in concert with state officials, and also to cover private
individuals acting under authority granted by state statute.7
Thus in Santiago v. McElroy12 state action was found both
because the statutory distraint law required state officials to per-
form the sale of lessees' property, and because it was only as a result
of statutory authorization that lessors could distrain lessees' prop-
erty at all. In Hall v. Garson3 state action was found in the func-
tional role the lessor performed.
In this case the alleged wrongful conduct was admittedly
perpetrated by a person who was not an officer of the state
or an official of any state agency. But the action taken, the
entry into another's home and the seizure of another's prop-
erty, was an act that possesses many, if not all, of the char-
acteristics of an act of the State. The execution of a lien,
whether a traditional security interest or a quasi writ of
attachment or judgment lien has in Texas traditionally
been the function of the sheriff or constable. Thus [Texas'
distraint remedy] vests in the landlord and his agents au-
thority that is normally exercised by the state and histori-
cally has been a state function.74
These findings of state action have not been accepted univer-
sally. Kerrigan v. Boucher5 held that in the distraint situation the
lessor was not an agent of the state and the fact that distraint was
made possible through specific statutory grant was not enough to
constitute state action. Indeed acceptance of the Santiago and Hall
interpretation of state action may well carry the concept of state
action too far.7" To go this far in finding state action would be to
forsake the concept of state action entirely, a proposition which has
attracted some scholarly support.77 Presently, however, a finding of
state action is still required.
The Santiago and Hall view of state action does have the com-
71. Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corporation, 338 F. Supp. 390, 393 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
72. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
73. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
74. Id. at 439.
75. Kerrigan v. Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn. 1971).
76. McGuane v. Chernango Ct., Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding no state
action in the New York distraint statute).
77. Black, "State Action", Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV.
L. RF'v. 69 (1967).
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mendable quality of getting to the merits of the case. Having re-
solved the concept of state action, courts following the Santiago and
Hall view easily find a lack of procedural safeguards in the lessor
distraint remedies.
It is fair to conclude that due process generally requires the
kinds of 'notice' and hearing which are aimed at establish-
ing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the
underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can
be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use. 8
The lessee is deprived of any such notice or hearing before the lessor
takes his property under distraint procedures."
In upholding Santiago, Sellers v. Contino" noted a different
type of constitutional defect. Plaintiffs in Sellers claimed that the
lessor's distraint procedures represented a chilling effect upon their
rights to organize and their freedom of expression. With the leverage
of the distraint remedies facing them, lessees felt hesitant to report
housing code violations, or to take advantage of other legal rights
such as repair and deduct statutes."
One would have to forsake the state action concept-or con-
strue it quite liberally-to find state action in the security deposit
transaction. But dealing with the relative merits, as the Santiago
and Hall courts were willing to do, one cannot ignore the same basic
unfairness found in the security deposit practice as is found in the
distraint remedies. The possession of the security deposit by the
lessor represents a chilling effect on the lessee's rights during the
term of the lease. And, at the termination of the lease, the lessee is
denied, contrary to all modern notions of fairness, any opportunity
to be heard. Although the state action requirement prohibits consti-
tutional grounds for change, certainly such inequities should war-
rant legislative involvement.
STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS
Several state legislatures have addressed themselves to the se-
78. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Mihans v. Municipal
Court of Berkeley-Albany Judicial District, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 488, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23
(1970).
79. State ex rel Payne v. Walden, 190 S.E.2d 770, 778 (Ct. App. W. Va. 1971).
80. Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
81. Roche v. Lamb, 26 N.Y.2d 538, 311 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1970).
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curity deposit problem. The New York legislature has initiated
some changes.2 The lessor in New York is under an affirmative duty
to place the deposit in a separate account bearing interest. 3 The
statute is not subject to waiver, but upon specific agreement the
interest earned on behalf of the lessee may be applied to rent as
credit. 4 The effect of the New York statute is to make the lessor a
trustee by operation of law. "' As trustee the lessor must keep the
funds segregated, and if he has commingled the funds, the lessee is
entitled to immediate return of the deposit in full and the lessor can
no longer avail himself of the deposit." The statute severely limits
the lessor's opportunity for investment of the deposit since he must
notify the lessee of the institution where the funds are deposited. 7
Several other states have effected minor changes. Some states
require the lessor to specifically enumerate all claims against the
deposit.88 The lessor is thereby compelled to affirmatively justify his
retention of the deposit, but the impartiality of this determination
still remains suspect. The only legitamacy added to the lessor's
retention of the deposit is the minor deterrence that explaining one's
actions has on that individual.
An interesting change in the very substance of the relationship
created by the security deposit transaction is a Colorado statute, 9
which shifts the ultimate burden of proof to the lessor. The lessor
must persuasively show that any partial or total retention of the
deposit was in fact not wrongful, but warranted by actual losses or
damages covered in the security deposit clause. A penalty clause in
the statute for willful or wrongful retention of any portion of the
deposit is aimed at producing a more accurate assessment of dam-
82. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAWS § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 1972). See also ILL. ANN, STAT.
ch. 74, § 91 (Smith-Hurd 1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 15B (Supp. 1970); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 46: 8-19 to 8-23 (Supp. 1972).
83. State by Lefkowitz v. Parker, 67 Misc.2d 36, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 473 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T.),
rev'd on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 2d 542, 327 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1971); 1971 N.Y. Op. Ar'y
GEN. 21.
84. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
85. In re Pal-Playwell, Inc., 334 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1964); State by Lefkowitz v. Parkches-
ter Apts. Co., 61 Misc. 2d 1020, 307 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
86. In re Perfection Technical Services Press Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 352, 256 N.Y.S.2d
166, af'd 18 N.Y.2d 644, 273 N.Y.S.2d 71, 219 N.E.2d 424 (1965).
87. 1970 N.Y. Op. ATr'y GEN. 17, 163.
88. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.261 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.19 (Supp.
1973); N.J. REV. STAT. § 46: 8-19 (Supp. 1972).
89. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-28 (1971).
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ages. The pragmatic situation of the lessee, however, still limits the
benefits of the shift of the burden of proof. To challenge alleged
discriminatory or arbitrary action by the lessor, the lessee must still
resort to costly litigation, a practical impossibility in many cases.
AN ALTERNATIVE
The lessor's interest as a potential creditor is not sufficient to
justify a summary power forfeiture of a lessee's deposit." The possi-
bility of a lessee skipping rent or damaging the premises is present,
but not persuasive enough to warrant a blanket denial of the lessee's
basic right to protest or defend before his property is taken away.'
The lessor should not be allowed to proceed summarily on the ten-
uous presumption that all lessees are potential rent-skippers or
apartment-wreckers. States have denied even a prejudgment at-
tachment or garnishment of an individual's property where the
claim against him is in tort, reasoning that such claims do not
represent a liquidated amount and, until judgment, remain too ten-
uous.92 How much more tenuous is a lessor's claim against a lessee
when compared to that of a plaintiff in a tort suit? The tort action
is based on an alleged factual happening already consummated
rather than on the presumption that the particular lessee might
commit a tort (i.e., excessive wear and tear to the premises) at
sometime in the future.
A possible solution in line with recent debtor/creditor develop-
ments would be enactment of legislative guidelines and standards
which would enumerate circumstances sufficient to warrant pre-
judgment creditor protection for the lessor. Even Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., recognized certain instances which warrant
abandonment of a pre-attachment hearing.93 Certainly the transient
and financially weak lessee represents a potentially great risk to the
lessor.94 But it would appear not to be an excessive burden on the
lessor to require him initially to establish the potential lessee as a
risk. For example; if the lessee did not have a job in the locale for
the previous year, if the lessee showed a pattern of transient living,
90. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); State ex rel Payne v. Walden,
190 S.E.2d 770, 778 (Ct. App. W. Va. 1972).
91. Cases cited note 90 supra.
92. Cleveland v. San Antonio Building & Loan Ass'n, 148 Tex. 211, 223 S.W.2d 226
(1949). See also Annot., 12 A.L.R. 2d 787 (1950).
93. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 394 U.S. 337 (1969).
94. See note 6 supra.
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or if a check on the lessee's bank accounts (or charge cards) shows
a degree of financial irresponsibility, then a security deposit would
be defensible. It would not require much effort to telephone the
prospective lessee's employer, bank or previous lessor. Statutory
authorization of the use of security deposits upon the finding of
specific credit hazards (i.e., no job, no bank account, etc.) would
legitimize the lessor's requirement of a security deposit.
With the need for a security deposit established, the deposit
would be placed in a responsible financial institution, bearing inter-
est.9 5 The lessee would notify the lessor of the location of the deposit
and the fund would remain intact through the duration of the lease.
Upon termination of the lease, settlement of the ultimate disposi-
tion of the deposit by the parties themselves would be encouraged.
Both legal notions of fairness and common sense dictate an oppor-
tunity for confrontation of the lessor's claims. Participation in the
assessment and evaluation of damages and an opportunity to ex-
plain or defend would be essential to the fairness of the system and,
in addition, would appease much of the lessee's feeling of being
unfairly treated when his deposit is retained.
If a dispute reaches an impasse, then the parties would resort
to an impartial arbiter. The use of a third party has been discour-
aged by individuals other than lessors, however:
Apart from the lessor's reasons, another factor which has
probably tended to discourage the use of the depositary for
small deposits is the reluctance of banks and trust compa-
nies to accept such special deposits when the compensation
forthcoming is not adequately proportioned to the risks and
inconveniences involved."
The use of such depositaries and financial institutions would meet
with further resistance if these institutions were saddled with the
additional arbitration burden.
A very logical party to act as trustee of the fund and arbiter of
the dispute would be the various housing code enforcement agencies
found throughout urban America. 7 These agencies are qualified to
determine the habitability and conditions of the premises. An excel-
95. N.Y. GEN. OBLIC. LAW § 7-103(2a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
96. Beaty v. Armstrong, 95 Okla. 109, 218 P. 516 (1923).
97. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 805 (1965).
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lent procedure-far superior to complete absence of any procedural
standards-would be to confront the lessee through such an agency
with a summary of claims made against the deposit with provision
for him to respond in any manner he chooses, whether by denial,
explanation or supporting witnesses."' A few quick phone calls, or a
five minute inspection of the premises by an agency official would
provide a modicum of procedural safeguards "aimed at estab-
lishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underly-
ing claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his
property or its unrestricted use."99 The disposition of the deposit
would then be directed according to the agency official's findings.
The use of the housing code enforcement agencies does present
some problems. Housing code enforcement agencies are already
strained by lack of funds and staff.'00 Several considerations, how-
ever, make the use of the housing code enforcement agency more
feasible than the use of banking and similar financial institutions.
Financing can be partially accomplished through the administra-
tive expense allowance found in statutory modifications already
enacted."" Additional thrift in the administration of the fund can
be achieved through proper commingling of numerous individual
deposits. Normally the duty of the trustee is to prevent commin-
gling of deposits.'02 However,
where the trustee holds the funds of numerous beneficiar-
ies, and it would be unreasonable and not subserve any
purpose in protecting the interests of the beneficiaries of
the several trusts to require him to keep the funds of the
different trusts, it may be proper for the trustee to mingle
the funds of the different trusts by deposit thereof in a
common bank account. Thus, ordinarily a trust company
can properly deposit in a single trust account in another
bank the funds of several trusts, provided it keeps an accur-
ate record of contributions of the separate trusts.'3
98. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.07, at 169 (3rd ed. 1972).
99. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
100. See Note, supra note 97, at 804. Defining department functions and roles would
eliminate much of the present overlapping and inefficiencies in the programs. Elimination
of some departments and reorganization of others would economize many agencies. Id. at 809.
101. N.J. REV. STAT. § 46: 8-19 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. GEN. OBLIc,. LAW § 7-103(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1972).
102. Sommers v. Timely Toys, Inc., 209 F.2d 342 (2d Cir, 1953); In re DeGregorio, 219
F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
103. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179c (1959).
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Allowing proper commingling of the separate deposits would make
management of the fund easier and provide a comparatively greater
return through economies of size. This larger amount could be in-
vested at higher interest rates and produce a greater absolute return
on the money.
Probably the most attractive consequence of placing the secu-
rity deposit burden upon housing code enforcement agencies is that
it compliments the existing statutory duties of these agencies. The
management of security deposits through such a program would
provide additional justifications for the security deposit device.
These deposits would become a supplemental tool in aiding the
enforcement of a wide range of housing code regulations. In effect
lessors would bring housing code enforcement upon themselves
when they make a claim against the security deposit. The individual
housing code agencies would have the aid of legions of quasi-
inspectors in the person of each and every lessee.
The administrative agent's decision would have one basic pur-
pose: to produce an initial unbiased determination of the validity
of the claim against the deposit. The administrative agent's deci-
sion would not be determinative of the merits of the claims in-
volved and the decision would be subject to judicial review. 104
However, because of the modest amounts involved, the relative
high cost of judicial review, and the judicial tendency to give a
character of finality to an administrative decision, the agency
decision may well be determinative in all but a very few cases.0 5
Either party may be prejudicially bound by an erroneous deter-
mination by the agency, but such a decision would at least be a
product of an unbiased origin.
The question in one aspect is whether we should sometimes
increase the procedural protections we now provide, for
when we are limited to choosing between all and none, we
sometimes choose none, if we had a choice among all, some
and none, we might sometimes choose some instead of
none. 1
06
Presently the lessee has the benefit of no procedural safeguards;
104. K. DAVIS, supra note 98, at 174-75.
105. Id. at 175.
106. Id. at 169.
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perhaps a modicum of procedural safeguards will help to equalize
the interests involved.
CONCLUSION
Use of the security deposit by lessors as protection against pos-
sible damages and rent skips arose as a result of the unwieldy nature
of the original lessor remedies. Neither the right of distraint nor the
statutory lien proved readily adaptable to the lessor's needs. Resort
was then made to contractual protection through the standard in-
clusion of security deposit clauses. As this practice has developed,
several economic and social factors have worked to put the lessee
in a take-it-or-leave-it situation.
The typical security deposit clause, couched in vague, all-
inclusive language, calls for the satisfactory performance of all the
terms of the lease contract. The vagueness of the security deposit
transaction becomes even more acute when the lease is formed
through an oral understanding. In an attempt to give form and
definition to the security deposit transaction, courts have employed
debt, pledge and trust theories. The difficulty with such labeling,
however, is that each of these legal relationships involve precisely
the same physical act, and any distinction arises out of the intent
of the parties. Normally no exact definition and status is given to
the security deposit by the parties themselves, and consequently the
courts are forced to guess whether debt, pledge or trust was in-
tended.
Because of the superior bargaining position the lessor enjoys, he
benefits from the physical possession of the deposit throughout the
term of the lease. Possession of the lease during the life of the lease
affords the lessor an opportunity for personal investment. And at
the termination of the lease, the discretion of the lessor usually
determines the ultimate disposition of the deposit. This decision
almost always stands because of the relatively high cost of challeng-
ing the decision of the lessor through the legal process.
The present practice tends to "harden lines" between the par-
ties involved and eventually the landlord-tenant relationship degen-
erates into extra-legal retaliations typified by rent skips and vandal-
ism by the lessee and large deposits and summary retention of the
entire deposit by the lessor.' °0 The security deposit thus becomes
107. Comment, Tenant Unions: Collective Bargaining and the Low Income Tax
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self-defeating: lessees simply skip the last month's rent and allow
the lessor to keep the entire deposit as that month's rent.
Arguably the public interest in providing a fund that is avail-
able for collection of debts before such a debt is conclusively liqui-
dated is only marginally advanced by the requirement of a security
deposit.'0 1 The basic unfairness of denying one an opportunity to
defend his position before an unbiased arbiter has led several courts
to rule state distraint statutes unconstitutional. After meeting the
original obstacle of state action, courts have no difficulty in finding
a lack of procedural safeguards in such a pre-hearing confiscation
of the lessee's money.
Requiring the deposit to be placed with a third party and re-
quiring the lessor to legitimize his claims against the deposit
through an unbiased determination would eliminate the interest
free loan aspect of the present system and prevent a dishonest or
biased disposition of the deposit at the termination of the lease. By
placing the task of managing and ultimately disposing of the deposit
with the various housing code enforcement agencies, the security
deposit would supplement existing housing code enforcement. Such
a procedure would undoubtedly create some burden and expense for
the lessor, but the possibility of "honest error or irritable misjudg-
ment" by the lessor is too great to allow the present security deposit
practice to stand. Development of procedures for prompt determi-
nations and skillful management of funds will prevent much of the
strain on fiscal and administrative resources,'0 and will at the same
time introduce into the security deposit transaction the impartial
fairness so sorely lacking today.
Tenant, 77 YALE L.J. 1368, 1374 (1968).
108. Note, Attachment and Garnishment-Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law,
68 MicH. L. REv. 986 (1970).
109. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
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